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ABSTRACT
I analyse the welfare impact of a mixed market with a public or
private firm with some degree of altruism, in the presence of an
agency problem. Contrary to some earlier findings, the total
surplus turns out to be increasing in the degree of altruism.This
impact is stronger than if there is no agency problem, despite more
stringent conditions for the market to remain mixed. The altruistic
firm is more cost-efficient, and viable if the market can remain
mixed. A competition policy that encourages entry may increase
welfare, but its scope is reduced by higher altruism.
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1. Introduction
A mixed oligopoly is a market where firms with different objectives interact. Most of the
literature has focused on public firms with wider objectives that improve the market
allocation, but the nonprofit firms can also be private. For example, Lakdawalla and
Philipson (2006) and Philipson and Posner (2009) deal with the impact of altruism and the
need for antitrust policies in its presence, and hence with a mixed market.
Historical examples of mixed oligopolies include markets with state ownership with
wider objectives in the UK (Rees, 1984: 219n; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988: 127, 130-34;
De Fraja 1991), Argentine (Xu and Birch, 1999), Finland (Miettinen, 2000), and to some
extent the U.S. (Martin, 1959) and France (Sheahan, 1966). Private-sector examples
include retail co-ops in Finland and Sweden (Willner, 2006b) and providers of health-care
and education in the U.S. (Philipson and Posner, 2009). Despite being abortive, the
proposed public option within the US health-care reform (see Krugman, 2010) shows at
least that the theory of the mixed oligopoly is connected to real-life problems. Also,
nationalisation (as a response to the present economic crisis) and liberalisation (of former
public monopolies) have introduced mixed ownership in new markets (see De Fraja,
2009), and hence at least an opportunity for wider objectives.
Public firms became unfashionable during the era of privatisation, which was often
seen as a way to improve cost efficiency. But the mixed oligopoly has been even more
controversial when costs are not an issue, because of its threat to the survival of the profit
maximisers (the Cournot-paradox; see Nett, 1993). For example, the US public option was
feared to crowd out the private insurers (The Guardian, 29.9.2009). Low returns have in
fact been described as subsidies that undermine private-sector profitability (Monsen and
Walters, 1983: 120). Wider objectives are then seen as predatory behaviour and hence as
an antitrust offence rather than a solution.
1 This is also related to the notion that altruism,
in the form of wider objectives among private firms, is equivalent to a cost advantage
(Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2006).
1 The following definition by Cabral and Riordan (1997: 160) would classify nonprofit firms in mixed
markets as predatory: "We call an action predatory if (1) a different action would increase the likelihood that
rivals remain viable, and (2) the different action would be more profitable under the counterfactual
hypothesis that the rival’s viability were unaffected." However, De Fraja (2009) suggests that such behaviour
should be prosecuted only if it conflicts with the firm’s objective function.2
A number of alternative assumptions have been adopted to ensure that an oligopoly
remains mixed, but they also reduce its predicted benefits (Newbery, 2006). Profit
maximisers would for example survive by being more efficient, but in many real-world
markets this does not apply (see section 6). Increasing marginal costs would allow for
survival among profit maximisers through lower marginal costs, but such an assumption is
not supported by the empirical literature (Johnston, 1960; Martin, 2004). Exit would be
prevented also through the more reasonable assumption that the altruistic firms combine
social and commercial objectives.
2 However, this would (in all previous models) limit the
social benefits because of the imperfectly competitive restraint on output.
3 Philipson and
Posner (2009) suggest that both altruists and profit maximisers have an incentive to
restrain output in this way. They argue that the deadweight loss is increasing in the degree
of altruism and that antitrust legislation should therefore apply to all firms and markets.
While there is no crowding-out if marginal costs are increasing, the technical
similarity between altruism and a cost advantage implies that the marginal firm is a
profit-maximiser. It follows that altruism cannot improve the allocation if there is also free
entry (Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2006). However, it is a stylised fact that entry is sluggish
even in the presence of profit opportunities (Geroski, 1995). The case of mixed markets
under conditions of imperfect competition and constant marginal costs might therefore
deserve more attention.
The present contribution revisits the positive or negative welfare effect of a mixed
oligopoly. I ask whether wider objectives or altruism are beneficial in the presence of an
agency problem that affects cost-cutting incentives, and given a constraint that the
profit-maximising firms should survive. Because of suggestions in the previous literature
of a small or even negative welfare impact of a mixed oligopoly, I also analyse the need
for a competition policy that encourages entry, as a complement or an alternative.
I set up a model with endogenous marginal costs that depend on the unobserved
effort of a manager. Such models have been used before for analysing cost differences
related to ownership and competition (De Fraja, 1993; Willner and Parker, 1997; Martin,
1993; Beiner et al., 2009). There is also a literature on incentive wages in a
2 In the case of public ownership, this is often called partial privatisation (Fershtman, 1990,
Matsumara, 1998; Saha and Sensarama, 2007). However, a given share of state ownership does not
necessarily translate to a similar weight for social welfare.
3 Some other approaches to keep an oligopoly mixed are described in Willner (2006a).3
mixed-oligopoly. However, it can be shown that a complete alignment between the
manager’s and the firm’s objectives is not necessarily optimal, and this literature has
mainly focused on the strategic choice of weights in the reward function (Barros, 1995;
Goering, 2007; Saha and Sensarama, 2008; Heywood and Ye, 2009).
4 This is the first
contribution to focus on potential cost distortions in a realistic mixed oligopoly with
constant marginal costs and asymmetric information.
It turns out that the impact of altruism/wider objectives is positive and that it is
strengthened when the endogeneity of the marginal costs is taken into consideration. The
social costs of imperfect competition (if plausibly defined) are in other words decreasing
in altruism, contrary to Philipson and Posner (2009). Also, the altruistic firm would
survive without subsidies as long as the oligopoly remains mixed, i.e. as long as the private
firms do not exit. The critical degree of altruism that would provoke exit is increasing in
factors that increase the value of an agency parameter (the variance of the random
component of the marginal costs and the manager’s risk-aversion and disutility of effort).
Altruism reduces a firm’s marginal costs (but increases the marginal costs of its
competitors). A policy that encourages entry can be a beneficial complement to the mixed
oligopoly, but only if firms are few and if the degree of altruism is moderate. However, a
public monopoly can otherwise be superior, in particular if the value of the agency
parameter is low.
Next section presents the basic model, and section 3 a benchmark version with given
marginal costs, showing that increased altruism always reduces the welfare loss of
imperfect competition. Section 4 analyses the welfare effects in the presence of a
principal-agent problem, and the scope for a policy that promotes entry. Section 5 extends
the analysis to conditions where the public firm might get higher marginal costs. Section 6
presents concluding remarks and a discussion and interpretation of results that contradict
conventional wisdom. Proofs are, when needed, included in an appendix.
2. The basic model
I analyse a market with n+1 firms and linear demand normalised as p=a x, where p and x
stand for price and output. Firm 1 maximises a weighted sum of its own profits and
4 For example, the manager of an altruistic firm can be given a stronger profit incentive so as to avoid
an excessive output that would lead to high marginal costs.4
industry output, as in Herr (2009).
5 Such a model is simpler than if assuming a weight for
the consumer surplus, but carries a similar logic as in a mixed oligopoly where one firm
has wider objectives. This assumption makes sense in the light of the evidence of wider
objectives than profit maximisation among state-owned firms (see section 1). However,
this approach also corresponds to the analysis of private altruistic firms in Philipson and
Posner (2009). A third and more sinister interpretation is that Firm 1 is a public firm that
gives a weight to output because of politicians who need to please their voters (see Boycko
et al, 1995).
6 In what follows, we shall however refer to Firm 1 as ’altruistic’.
There are also n identical profit maximising or conventional firms; these will be
indexed by i. All firms are assumed to have Cournot-conjectures. Let π and α stand for
profits and the weight for output. The altruistic firm then maximises αx+π1, whereas a
profit maximising firm i maximises just πi.
All firms are managerial. Firm 1 is managerial because most charities and  state
enterprises are led by an appointed manager. The profit-maximising oligopolists are
managerial, because oligopolists tend to be relatively large and are rarely owner-managed.
All managers are identical and they maximise utility, which is increasing in income and
decreasing in effort. This rules out intrinsic motivation and a public-sector ethos.
There is asymmetric information in the sense that the owner cannot know whether
for example high marginal costs are explained by bad luck or by a low effort. Marginal
costs c depend on a constant parameter c0, on the manager’s effort e, and on a normally
distributed random variable u with zero mean and the variance σ
2. Following Raith (2003)
and Beiner et al. (2009), I assume that they can be written c=c0 eu . The owner observes
c and hence indirectly e+u, but not its components.
7 Also, the manager’s utility depends on
income (w), disutility of effort ( ke
2/2), and a parameter (r) that can be shown to represent
the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk-aversion:
U =−exp[−r(w −ke
2/2)] . (2.1)
5 Strictly speaking, their altruistic firm values its own rather than industry output, but the difference
does not matter here.
6 As pointed out by Willner (2001), such behaviour may be socially beneficial and may be difficult to
distinguish from genuine (partial) welfare maximisation.
7 Because of linear demand, cost and demand uncertainty yield the same results. The owner observes
in the latter case ac 0+e+u but not e, where u denotes a demand shock.5
In order to ensure the existence of meaningful solutions, k>1 must hold true.
With utility decreasing in effort everywhere, the manager would shirk without
high-powered incentives. The employer therefore pays a performance-related wage that is
increasing in the observable magnitude e+u. Let w0 denote a positive or negative intercept
and β a coefficient that expresses the impact of the firm’s risky performance:
The expected value and variance of the wage are then   and  =β
2σ
2. Substitute
(2.2) for w in (2.1) and use the assumption of normally distributed shocks to rewrite the
expected utility as a function of the expected income and its variance:
Incentive compatibility means that the manager maximises her expected utility given
the parameters of the reward function. Maximise (2.3) to get
With a zero reservation utility like in Beiner et al. (2009), the participation constraint
becomes V=0. Insert (2.4), solve for w0 and insert w0 and e into  :
The abbreviation
can be interpreted as a parameter that expresses the significance of the agency problem. It
is larger than unity (because k>1) and increasing in disutility of effort, risk-aversion, and
the variance of the random shocks. Use (2.5) and (2.6) to express the wage schedules in
terms of this parameter:
w = w0 +β ( e +u). (2.2)
σw
2 w = w0 +β e






























Strictly speaking, the employer decides on w0 and β, but we may as well use (2.7) and
(2.8) to maximise the objective function directly with respect to e.
3. The impact of altruism in a mixed oligopoly with given marginal costs
This section provides a benchmark-model that enables us to compare the impact of
altruism with and without endogenous marginal costs. It basically adds n
profit-maximising competitors to a monopoly model that is included in Philipson and
Posner (2009).
8 Suppose that the degree of altruism (i.e. the weight α) is lower than under
full welfare maximisation (see below), as for example when the authorities do not desire a
public firm to become a monopolist. This can be interpreted as an imperfectly competitive
restraint on output, so there is a social cost of preventing exit.
In this section marginal costs are given as c, so there is no principal-agent problem.
The altruistic firm maximises
whereas all other firms maximise
Let xp stand for  . Because of the Cournot-conjectures, the first-order condition of











Ω1 =α x +ax1 −xx1 −cx1,( 3.1)
πi = axi −xxi −cxi; i = 2,3,…n.( 3.2)
Σixi
a −c +α−2x1 −xp = 0.( 3.3)
8 No results are affected by my normalisation that changes the slope of inverse demand from  b to  1.7
Rearrange the sum of the profit-maximising firms’ first-order conditions:
Combining (3.3) and (3.4) yields the following output levels:
The price is then
It is obvious that Firm 1 would be profitable for values of α below ac  and that its profits
are higher than in each profit-maximising firm.
If all firms maximise profits, we normally think of the deadweight loss as the
difference between the imperfectly competitive total surplus and its first-best level TS*,
associated with p*=c and x*=ac . However, such full welfare maximisation can only be
achieved for α = ac , in which case the private firms would exit, as follows from (3.7) and
(3.6) respectively. The total surplus,
can therefore never reach its first-best value TS* = (ac )
2/2 without the market becoming a
public monopoly. However, it can come arbitrarily close as α approaches the upper bound
of the open interval ]0,ac [ in which the oligopoly can remain mixed. This justifies the use
of TS* as a point of comparison. The (absolute value of the) deadweight or welfare loss
associated with a given value of α is therefore:
n(a −c)−nx1 −( n +1)xp = 0.( 3.4)
x1 =




n(a −c −α )
n +2
,( 3.6)









(n +1)(n +3)(a −c)




It is obvious that (3.10) is decreasing and the total surplus increasing in α.
These observations on the case of given and equal marginal costs are summarised in
the following lemma, the proof of which is trivial and therefore omitted:
Lemma 1. i) The altruistic firm in a mixed oligopoly with given marginal costs is
profitable if the private firms can survive, and its profits are higher than among its rival
firms; ii) The deadweight loss of imperfect competition is decreasing in α. iii) An increase
in the number of firms when α is given increases welfare (reduces the deadweight loss).
In other words, the altruistic firm is viable in this context. The fact that more firms
mean higher welfare is consistent Philipson and Posner (2009) who argue in favour of an
antitrust policy that encourages entry also in the presence of altruism. However, part ii)
contradicts their finding that the deadweight loss is increasing in α, as implied by their
interpretation of α as a cost advantage. The socially optimal monopoly price would then be
c α, which would imply the deadweight loss
This expression is increasing in α, for the same reason that it is decreasing in c. However,
it is hard understand why the optimal allocation should require a monopolist to make
losses if he is willing earn less than the maximum profits, when pure greed (α=0) would
allow him at least to break even.
9 Also, why should a public firm be subsidised in the
absence of other potential market failures? (The price cannot in addition equal c α if n>0,



















9 By extension, consider a misanthropic monopolist who values a restraint of output as an end in itself
(α < 0). This would be formally equivalent to higher marginal costs. Philipson’s and Posner’s (2009) optimal
price would then be c+|α|, so their deadweight loss would be decreasing in |α|.9
A positive welfare impact may on the other hand be too small for being of any
practical importance. Define the maximum impact of altruism as the percentage difference
in total surplus between a conventional oligopoly (i.e, a market with n+1 firms and α=0)
and a mixed oligopoly with a total surplus close to but below (ac )
2/2. Lemma 2 then
makes it possible to compare the outcome in section 4 with the more conventional mixed
oligopoly in this section:
Lemma 2. The maximum percentage impact of altruism on a mixed market is
Proof: See Appendix.
One, four and nine profit maximisers would for example correspond to values of m1
of 12.50%, 2.86% and 0.83%, so altruism has a significant impact only if firms are few,
like in the earlier literature.
4. The case of endogenous marginal costs
4.1. Corporate performance
The model in section 3 is now amended by assuming that the marginal costs c can be
reduced through the manager’s effort, so that their expected size is c0 e. There is now in
addition a fixed cost, i.e. the manager’s wage  . As follows from section 2, the
expected values of the objective functions become:
The mechanisms would be similar in a two-stage analysis, but it turns out to be




















xi and ei, given the competitors’ choices. Impose thereafter ex post symmetry so that xi=xj
and ei=ej for all i, j = 2,3,...n and rearrange. Use the inverse demand function to get p and
note that  , x=x1+xp. We then get:
We can use this solution to make the following observations on the viability and
comparative performance of the altruistic firm:
Proposition 1. i) The altruistic firm has lower expected marginal and average costs
than its profit maximising rivals and an increase in its altruism increases their expected
marginal and average costs; ii) An increase in the degree of altruism of Firm 1 reduces
the weighted average of the expected marginal and average costs on the market; iii) The
the altruistic firm is profitable if α is below the value   at which the
private firms would exit.
Proof: See Appendix.
Part i) may seem controversial, but it extends results on efficiency and ownership in
De Fraja (1993) and Willner and Parker (2007) to a mixed oligopoly. The intuition is
based on the fact that wider objectives strengthen the incentive to buy efforts from an
essentially lazy and greedy manager. However, section 5 extends the model so that another
outcome becomes possible. As for the impact of increased altruism on rival’s costs, a
higher α reduces the profit-maximisers’ market share and profit margin, as follows from
Σixi = xp
x1 =
(φ − 1)(a −c0)+[ ( n +1)φ − 1]α











(φ − 1)(a −c0)+[ ( n +1)φ − 1]α




φ(n +2−1/φ)(φ − 1)
,( 4.7)
p =
(φ − 1)a +φ( n +1)c0 −φα
φ(n +2−1/φ)
.( 4.8)
ˆ α=( φ−1)(a −c0)/φ11
(4.4) and (4.5). This makes it more difficult to afford paying for cost-cutting efforts. Part
ii) means that this effect is not strong enough to lead to lower cost efficiency on average.
The intuition is again based on the profit maximisers’ falling market share, which
compensates for their higher marginal and average costs when calculating the average.
Part iii) is important not least because of concerns that altruistic (public) firms would
not survive in an open economy where subsidies are ruled out (Haskel and Szymanski,
1992; Bös, 1993). The altruistic firm would make losses also in this model if α is too high,
but such values would exceed   and would therefore be inconsistent with the oligopoly
being mixed. The condition for the oligopoly to remain mixed is on the other hand stronger
than in section 3. For example, if  ,   is now reduced by a factor of 2/3.
4.2. Welfare effects
According to Lemma 1, an increase in altruism increases welfare when marginal costs are
given. In this subsection I ask whether this generalises to managerial firms. If so, how does
the percentage impact of altruism in a mixed oligopoly compare to the analysis in section
3? I also ask how an increase in the number of firms affects the solution in this case.
In addition to the stakeholders in section 3, there are now also paid managers in the
model, but their payoff (the reservation utility) is normalised to zero. Note also that the
inverse demand function implies the consumer surplus x
2/2. The total surplus is therefore
:
A market with only profit maximisers would reach the total surplus TS(0), which is equal
to the first term above. But if one of the firms is altruistic, the maximum total surplus is the




π1 +Σ iπi +x
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2 −( 3+2n)φ + 1
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2 +4n +3)φ
3 −( n +1)φ
2 .( 4.10)12
As it turns out, the welfare effect of altruism is positive like in the previous section,
provided that the oligopoly can remain mixed, and stronger than in section 3:
Proposition 2. i) An increase in the degree of altruism of Firm 1 increases the total
surplus; ii) The maximum percentage impact of altruism is higher than when marginal
costs are given.
Proof: See appendix.
Part i) differs from Philipson and Posner (2009) because of their definition of the
deadweight loss. It also differs from Heywood’s and Ye’s (2009) result that a mixed
oligopoly with n>1 may reduce welfare, because they assume increasing marginal costs.
10
However, the intuition behind i) and ii) is fairly obvious in the light of Proposition 1,
because of the reductions of both costs and the profit margin. Part ii) is important given the
limited or negative social benefits in the earlier literature, and may seem surprising
because of the now lower value of  . For example, m1 in section 3 is only 0.83% if there
are nine firms, but now we get m2 = 43.8 if  =2 and m2 = 22.34 if  =5.
Despite this powerful impact, we may ask whether it would always be beneficial that
profit maximising firms enter. Suppose first that all firms maximise profits (α=0). As
follows from (4.7), increased competition would then reduce the ability to afford
cost-reducing efforts, so marginal costs would in fact increase.
11 Entry can still be
beneficial, but only up to a point:
Lemma 3. i) An increase in the number of firms on a market with managerial
profit-maximising firms increases welfare if there are fewer firms than   and
vice versa; ii) The critical value   is increasing in risk and in the managers’





10 A welfare reduction may follow from also higher public-sector wages (Herr, 2009), e.g. because of
bargaining (but the excess wages are then part of the total surplus; see Grönblom and Willner, 2008).
However, the empirical evidence is inconclusive. In developed countries, females tend to get relatively
higher and males lower wages (Melly, 2005; Ramoni-Perazzi, 2006; Disney, 2007; Disney and Gosling,
2008). This may also be consistent with private rather than public-sector wage distortions.
11 This reflects earlier results on the relationship between cost efficiency and competition in
Cournot-models with managerial firms (see Martin, 1993; Willner and Parker, 2007).13
Proof: Se appendix.
It is well-known that too many firms would enter under conditions of free entry and
non-zero sunk costs (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). However, there are no sunk costs in
this model. The normalisation of the managers’ outside-option utility to zero means that
there is no upper bound for n, as implied by (4.4). The welfare loss when n>  is therefore
not caused by duplication of sunk costs but by higher marginal costs that overshadow the
benefits of lower profit margins. Values of   below 1.71 can even imply that a monopoly
is welfare superior. However, a more severe agency problem may paradoxically increase
the scope for welfare-increasing competition. For example,  =3 would imply 
(because   is the integer closest to 2.33), but  =10 would suggest  .
The intuition for the impact of   is based on the fact that the manager’s equilibrium
salary is decreasing in   (despite being increasing for a given effort), as follows from
inserting (4.6) and (4.7) into (2.7) and (2.8) when α=0. When   becomes very large,
marginal costs approach c0 and the salary zero, so we approach a conventional market with
no cost reducing efforts and hence no managerial salary. As long as a>c0, more firms
would then always mean a higher total surplus, like in a conventional model.
The following holds true when one of the firms is altruistic:
Proposition 3. The optimal number of profit maximising firms in a mixed market,
is decreasing in the degree of altruism.
Proof: See appendix.
In other words, altruism reduces the scope for entry to improve wefare. This suggests
that it is not always necessary to apply a competition policy that encourages entry an
ˆ n
φ
φ ˆ n = 3










markets with altruistic firms, contrary to Philipson and Posner (2009).
12
In fact, a public monopoly may be better than the mixed oligopoly even if α is low
enough to permit profit-maximising competitors to operate. This would be the case if
because   is then zero or negative. This extends the result that the optimal market may be
a public monopoly if α=0 and if   is small (Lemma 3) to the case of non-zero values of α
and low values of  . The intuition is the fact that higher values of α makes it more difficult
for the profit maximisers to afford cost-cutting efforts. When α gets sufficiently high,
society would be better of by exit.
On the other hand, the best market structure includes one or more profit maximising
firm if
because   then holds true.
13
For example, setting   equal to 2, 3 and 10 would imply values of   of 0.50(ac 0),
0.67(ac 0) and 0.90(ac 0). A public monopoly would then be superior despite the
possibility of coexistence for values of α exceeding 0.07(ac 0), 0.27(ac 0) and 0.73(ac 0).
This suggests that higher risk, risk-aversion and disutility of effort would permit not only
more altruism before the market becomes a monopoly, but also increase the threshold of














2 ˆ α, (4.13)
ˆ n(0)≥1
φ ˆ α
12 Their result is partially driven by increasing marginal costs, which mean that a restraint on output
among altruists leads to higher marginal costs among the profit maximisers.
13 Note that this analysis is approximate, because n must be an integer. A direct comparison of the
expressions for the total surplus according to (4.9) is necessary if (4.11) yields a value in the open interval
]0,1[.15
The impact of   on the desirability of welfare-increasing entry is more complicated
than in Lemma 3. Set ac 0=1 and suppose that α=0.25. A public monopoly is then
superior if  =3, whereas  =5 or  =10 would mean a welfare increase until there are two or
ten firms respectively.
14 With α=0.5, the monopoly is superior for  =3 and  =5, but  =14
if  =10. Thus, entry is not always desirable, contrary to section 3, but the scope for
competition is increasing in the agency parameter under reasonable circumstances.
5. An extension to higher risk-aversion in the altruistic firm
The assumption that risk, risk-aversion, and disutility of effortare the same in Firm 1 and
among its rivals has led to the conclusion that the altruistic firm is more cost efficient, with
the controversial corollary that public firms with wider objectives are more efficient than
private profit maximisers. However, assuming a higher   in Firm 1 can - under some
circumstances - yield another conclusion. This might be the case if production in the
altruistic firm is more risky, or if it attracts more lazy or risk-averse managers. These
alternatives are technically equivalent, but I refer for brevity to a higher   as reflecting
higher risk-aversion. Let the values of   be denoted by   and   respectively. Suppose that










φ1{(φp −1)(a −c0)+[ ( n +1)φp −1]α}
(φ1 −1)[(n +1)φp −1]+φ 1(φp −1)
,( 5.1)
xp =
nφp[(φ1 −1)(a −c0)−φ 1α]
(φ1 −1)[(n +1)φp −1]+φ 1(φp −1)
,( 5.2)
x =
(φ1φp −φ 1 +nφ1φp −nφp)(a −c0)+φ 1(φp −1)α
(φ1 −1)[(n +1)φp −1]+φ 1(φp −1)
,( 5.3)
e1 =
(φp −1)(a −c0)+[ ( n +1)φp −1]α
(φ1 −1)[(n +1)φp −1]+φ 1(φp −1)
,( 5.4)
ep =
(φ1 −1)(a −c0)−φ 1α
(φ1 −1)[(n +1)φp −1]+φ 1(φp −1)
,( 5.5)
14 Using (4.11) would in fact yield 2.9529 for  =5, but it turns out that the total surplus is higher if
there are two rather than three profit maximisers.
φ16
In the special case of α=0, Firm 1 is also a profit maximiser, in which case   > 
would imply e1 < ep. However, a nonzero α can in the opposite case compensate for a
higher  . As follows from (5.2), the private firms would exit if α   .  With
this restriction in mind, Firm 1 remains more cost efficient despite the fact that   >   if
Note that the interval above can never be empty, because   and   are larger than unity.
Thus, while a mixed oligopoly where e1 < ep is possible, e1 > ep holds true if
We can conclude that the analysis in section 4 applies unless the difference   is
too large, for example when a higher r puts Firm 1 too much at a disadvantage. In such
cases the beneficial effects of the mixed oligopoly become small or even negative.
We may also ask whether the viability of Firm 1 may become threatened. As follows
from (5.1), x1 is always positive. The public firm is therefore profitable if and only if
axc 0+e1/2 is positive (because e1 = x1/ ). Note also that α <   must
hold true, because the oligopoly would not remain mixed otherwise. As follows from (5.1),
(5.3) and (5.4), Firm 1 is then able to break even for any α that is consistent with a mixed
oligopoly, despite the disadvantage implied by a higher value of  .
6. Discussion and concluding remarks
The earlier literature tends to suggest that the welfare impact of a mixed oligopoly is
limited if positive at all. The present contribution means by contrast that the presence of a
firm with wider objectives is beneficial, with a potentially strong impact when marginal
costs are constant but dependent on unobservable managerial efforts. The altruistic firm
breaks even whenever the profit-maximising firms are willing to participate, even if the
p =
(φp −1)(φ 1 −1)a +( φ 1φp −φ 1 +nφ1φp −nφp)c0 −φ 1(φp −1)α
(φ1 −1)[(n +1)φp −1]+φ 1(φp −1)
.( 5.6)
φ1 φp










(n +1)φp +φ 1 −1
(a −c0)>α . ( 5.8)
φ1 −φ p
φ1 (φ1 −1)(a −c0)/φ1
φ17
manager of the altruistic firm is more risk averse or lazy. For high values of a parameter
that summarises risk, risk-aversion and the disutility of effort, there may be (a limited)
scope for a traditional antitrust policy that encourages entry. However, the optimal number
of firms is decreasing in the degree of altruism.
The most controversial finding may be related to the cost-efficiency of the public or
private altruistic firm. It flies in the face of conventional wisdom, but the theoretical and
empirical literature provides more mixed results than usually believed. While the surveys
by Borcherding et al. (1982), Megginson and Netter (2001) and Dewenter and Malatesta
(1997) do indeed suggest that public ownership reduces efficiency, a different and much
less black-and-white picture emerges from Millward (1982), Boyd (1986), Iordanoglou
(2001), Martin and Parker (1997), Willner (2001) and Florio (2004). Views are conflicting
also among theorists (see Pint, 1991; Estrin and Perotin, 1991; De Fraja, 1993; Willner and
Parker, 2007).
The fact that a combination of such familiar assumptions as Cournot-competition,
coexistence between altruistic and profit-maximising firms and asymmetric information
implies an outcome that is strongly in favour of a mixed oligopoly (also when associated
with public ownership) is however interesting also as an observation on mainstream
theory. The result on corporate performance partly follows from the fact that standard
theory treats the managerial effort to reduce costs as a commodity with a price. Only firms
with wider objectives than profit maximisation are then prepared to pay properly.
However, while it is too simplistic to dismiss the mixed oligopoly because of alleged
cost inefficiency or crowding-out, the present analysis should be interpreted carefully.
Real-world state-owned enterprises do not necessarily have objective functions such as in
the model, and distorted objectives are possible also among private nonprofits (see
Galaskiewicz and Bielefeld, 2003). Other modelling details may also be questioned. In
particular, the analysis has ignored the possibility of efforts without external rewards and
punishments, despite their potential significance in particular in public-sector and other
not-for-profit organisations (Francois, 2000). A proper understanding of the challenges
facing different types of firms and organisations on a mixed market might therefore require
a more careful analysis of work motivation among both managers and other staff.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. Use (3.5)-(3.8) to write the total surplus for the case α=0 as18
To get (3.12), calculate the percentage difference as compared to TS* as defined by (3.9)
and simplify. QED.
Proof of Proposition 1: i) The expected marginal costs are c0 e1 and c0 ep, and must
therefore be lower in Firm 1 because of (4.6) and (4.7). As for expected average costs, they
are c0 e1+ =  c0 e1/2 and c0 ep+ =  c0 ep/2, as follows from (4.3)-(4.4) and
(4.6)-(4.7) and therefore lower in the altruistic firm.
ii) Note that the weighted average   = (x1e1+xpep)x is
where
Differentiating with respect to α and rearranging shows that the average effort is
increasing in α (and the average marginal costs hence decreasing in α) under the condition
and vice versa. Note that C must be positive, because both roots of the equation C=0 are
complex for n>0. It is also obvious that BD>A. The average marginal costs are therefore
decreasing in α. As for average costs, it follows from the prof of part i) that their weighted
average must be decreasing in α. Part ii) is thereby proved.
TS |α=0=
(n
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A =( n +1)(φ−1)
2(a −c0)
2,( A.3)




2 +3n +1)−2(n +1)φ + 1,( A.5)
D =( n +1)(a −c0), (A.6)
E =[ ( n +2)φ − 1]( φ−1)
2.( A.7)
BD −A +2CDα+Cα
2 > 0 (A.8)19
iii) It is obvious from (4.4) that none of the profit-maximising firms would produce if
α >   = ( 1)(ac 0)/ . As for Firm 1, its profits are (pc 0+e1)x1 /2, or
Firm 1:s output is never negative, as follows from (4.3). The sign of the expression
therefore depends on the parenthesis to the left, which can be negative only if
However, it is obvious that this boundary is beyond the limit ( 1)(ac 0)/  at which the
profit-maximising firms would exit. We can therefore conclude that the altruistic firm is
viable for all values of α that are compatible with a mixed oligopoly remaining mixed. Part
iii) is thereby proved. QED
Proof of Proposition 2. i) Use (4.3)-(4.8) and add the consumer surplus x
2/2 to the
profits, which are (pc 0+e1)x1  and (pc 0+e2)xp  and rearrange to get the total
surplus as expressed by (4.9). It is obvious that its second term is positive for all α>0. If
the third term is also positive, it is trivially true that the total surplus is increasing in α. In
the opposite case, TS is concave with a maximum for some value α
M of α:
However, TS cannot be locally decreasing unless α
M < ( 1)(ac 0)/  (see Proposition 1).
Suppose as an antithesis that this is the case:
This inequality can be satisfied only for the following values of  :
e1
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It is obvious that this would require values of   below unity, which is ruled out by our
assumption that k>1. The total surplus is therefore increasing in α in the relevant interval.
Part i) is thereby proved.
ii) Suppose as an antithesis that there exist strictly positive values of n and values of
 such that   for which m1>m2. Use Lemma 2 and (4.10) to rearrange the condition
m1>m2 to
Combine this with the inequality
so as to get
Set the left hand side of (A.16) equal to zero so as to get a second-degree equation with the
roots
These roots are complex unless n=0, which would mean a monopoly, not a mixed
oligopoly. It follows that (A.16) is positive for all   and n>0. Hence, the maximum
percentage impact of altruism is always larger in a model with a principal-agent problem.
QED
Proof of Lemma 3. i) Differentiate (4.9) with respect to n when α=0 and set the




































Solving for n yields  . This is a maximum, because it is obvious that the
derivative in question is decreasing in n. Part i is thereby proved.
ii) Differentiate  (0) with respect to  . It follows that  (0) is minimised if  .
However, as this would imply a negative  (0), it follows that  (0) is increasing in   in the
relevant area. Part ii is thereby proved. QED
Proof of Proposition 3: Differentiate (4.9) with respect to n, rearrange and solve for
an extreme value that has to be a maximum:
However,   = ( 1)(ac 0)/  satisfies the polynomials both in the numerator and
denominator. Use this to simplify the expression to get (4.11). Note that its numerator is
decreasing and its denominator is increasing in α, so  (α) must be decreasing. QED
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